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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MANWARING fNVESTMENTS, L.C., an Idaho
limited liability company,
Plaintiff,

Supreme Court No. 44393

vs.

Bingham Case No. CV-2014-1958

CITY OF BLACKFOOT, a municipal corporation,
Defendant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District
State ofldaho In and For the County of Bingham
Honorable Darren B. Simpson, District Judge, Presiding
Attorney for Appellant

Attorney for Respondent

Kipp L. Manwaring
2677 East 17th Street, Suite 600
Idaho Falls, ID 83406

220 North Meridian

Ganett Sandow
Blackfoot, ID 83221
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ARGUMENT
A.

The district court erred as a matter of law when it sua sponte applied an alternative theory

that MILC failed to comply with LC. § 50-219.
Contrary to the City' s assertion in its Respondent's Brief on page 10, it did not directly attack
MILC 's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Indeed, the City could not attack any such failure
because MfLC had timely and properly presented its claim to the City Co uncil. Nowhere in the
clerk's record is there any support for the City' s naked assertion that it attacked MILC 's failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.
Notably, the City never raised the issue of J.C. § 50-219 before the magistrate or the district
court. The City's failure to timely and properly assert that defense bars the City from now claiming
somehow it is entitled to the protections of that statute.
An affirmative defense not properly raised by the City cannot be raised sua sponte by the
district court. See Deon v. H&J, Inc., 157 Idaho 665 , 669, 339 P.3d 550, 554 (2014) citing Sales v.

Peabody, 157 Idaho 195, 335 P.3d 40 (2014) and Heitz v. Carroll, 117 Idaho 373, 788 P.2d 188
(1990). Similarly, alternative grounds to support a judgment of a trial court must be based upon the
fact that the a lternative ground was presented to the trial court. Ley det v. City of Mountain

Home, 119 Idaho 1041, 1045, 812 P.2d 755 , 759 (Ct.App.1991 ).
The City did not address MILC 's arguments showing the district court's legal error in sua

sponte raising an issue that was never raised by the pleadings in the arguments of the parties below.
Nor did the City address MILC' s evidentiary challenge to the district court' s compounding errors in
creating facts not established by the record and ignoring the facts proving the complete absence of
any notice from the City to MlLC that the City was assessing 2 ED Us to the Building.

The district court erred in raising sua sponte an issue never ra ised before the magistrate.
Moreover, the district court's alternative theory for upholding the magistrate's judgment was not a
theory presented to or considered by the magistrate.

8.

The district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the City did not violate 1.C. §

50-1028.
Curiously, the City on page 11 of its Respondent's Brief begins with an incorrect assertion
that no facts support MILC' s claim and then immediately fo llows that assertion with an
acknowledgement of facts that were established. Lance Bates' affidavit did not, as the City contends,
become largely meaningless when MILC conceded the base rate for sewer services was reasonable.
Furthermore, at no time has MILC argued that the City must follow the City of Ammon's methods.
The City"s statements are clear misapplications of Bates' affidavit and MILC"s arguments.
The City obviously neglected the slate of facts set forth on page 23 of Appellant's Brief. No
effort was made by the City to argue against MTLC's stated facts. Interesting, however, was the
City's statement on page 9 of Respondent's Brief:
Unfo rtunately, there is no exact or precise way to charge for sewer fees. lt is
nol simply an issue of quantity of water consumed on the premises. It is an issue of
quantity of water, type of consumption, type of waste put into the water, quantity of
waste put into the water, and many other factors.

Absolutely nothing in the record on appeal sustains the City's above factors. The City cannot
point to a ny engineering study, system , basis, process, or actual application on which the above
factors are present. Nevertheless, the factors asserted by the City as necessary for estimating sewer
fees are fou nd on page 23 of Appellant's Brief and in Bates' affidavit.
Bates unequivocally testified that the national standards for determining EDU sewer rates for
an office building apply a factor of .04 per person occupying the building. Bates testified without
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challenge that relying solely on square footage to establish EDU multipliers is arbitrary. According
to the City' s listed factors, the City must concede that square footage alone is arbitrary.
MILC proved by uncontested evidence that the City's multiplier of 2 EDUs to the Bu ilding
bears no reasonable relationship to the actual sewer services received. Under that standard, MILC
established that the City violated LC. § 50-1028. Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 768
P.2d 765 (1989).

The City claims that MILC's concession that a base sewer rate of $30.04 per EDU was
reasonable invalidates MILC's arguments.

ot true. As clearly set forth in its Appellant' s Brief,

MILC contends the City's application of 2 EDU multipliers to the Building bears no reasonable
relationship to the actual benefit of the City's sewer service. MILC has proven the validity of its
argument with undisputed facts.
On that point, the City maintains, " Again, MILC misses the point because when dealing with
sewer fees the City is dealing with averages." That is exactly why national standards direct the City
to establish its base EDU rate. The City admits in its Respondent's Brief that its base EDU rate was
and is 350 gpd. Unquestionably, that rate was based on a known national average and constituted the
underlying basis for the City's EDU multipliers as set forth in both of its ordinances. MILC has
never argued the City must precisely measure wastewater discharge. Rather, MILC attacked the
City's arbitrary assessment of 2 ED U multipliers to the Building when the evidence proves the
Building is receiving the benefit of o nly I EDU of sewer service.
Where the City has charged MILC double sewer rates for the actual sewer service provided
to the Building, the City has violated J.C. § 50- 1028.

3

C.

The district court erred as a matter of law in determining the City was not unreasonable or

arbitrarv in its application of EDU multipliers to the Building.
Again, the City begins its arguments with opposing statements that no evidence shows the
City was arbitrary although some evidence was presented. The City's position lacks candor.
The City's ordinances control the determination of how many EDU multipliers should be
assessed an office bui lding. Both the prior ordinance effective 2007 through 2014 and the ordinance
effective May 20 I 4 to date are part of the augmented record on appeal. ( Order Granting Second

Motion to Augment Clerk's Record.)
Illustrative of the City's arbitrariness are the following statements in its Respondent's Brief
on page 7:
For example, currently on office bui ldings, they [EDUs] are looked at to determine
how many different business entities can be housed in the building and/or the total
size of the building. A building that houses only business and is under 4,000 square
feet would be assessed 1 point. . .. A building that is over 4,000 square feet would be
assessed 2 points. A building with two businesses would be assessed two points.

The City does not analyze the application of its 2007-2014 ordinance to the Building. Under
that ordinance the EDU factor applicable to the Building was: "Office, up to 20 employees." There
was no additional consideration for multiple businesses within a building. Facts prove the Building
always had less than 20 employees during the time the 2007-2014 ordinance was in effect.
When the City applied a multiplier of 2 EDUs to the Building under the 2007-2014
ordinance, it did so arbitrarily and in violation of its own ordinance. Of course, the City made no
responsive argument to that part ofMILC's contentions. Nor could it.
Under the May 2014 ordinance, the applicable factor is I EDU for a "Business for each 4,000
square feet (no food prep)."

Business or business office is not otherwise defined. Nor does the

ordinance define how square footage is determined. Contrary to the City's statement in its brief cited
above, the ordinance does not say a building housing more than one tenant business will be assessed
4

2 EDU multipliers.

Nor does the ordinance define how different business entities are to be

dete1mined for purposes of applying EDU multipliers.
Bates testified that based on known national engineering standards, the City's May 2014
ordinance assessing EDU multipliers on square footage alone is arbitrary.

-

unrefuted.

That testimony is

The City has no facts, studies, standards, or engineering evaluations showing that a

business consisting of 4,000 square feet equates to I EDU under the City's standard of 350 gpd.
Without any standard establishing 4,000 square feet of a business correlates to I EDU, the City's
May 2014 ordinance based on square footage alone is arbitrary.
The City's ord inances are based on the EDU of 350 gpd.

MILC has proven through

undisputed facts that the Building had 2, I 00 square feet of business office space, had Jess than 20
employees, consumed Jess than I 00 gpd in metered water, and discharged wastewater in a flowrate
equaling l/3 of the City's accepted standard for I EDU. Under those established facts, the City's
assessment of 2 EDU multipliers to the Building is arbitrary and unreasonable.

D.

The district court erred as a matter of law in determining that the City's sewer rates applied to

the Building were not an unlawful tax where MILC is paying for services it is not receiving.
The City claims MILC incorrectly relies upon North Idaho Building Contractors Association

v. City of Hayden, I 58 Idaho 79, 343 P.3d 1086 (2015). According to the City, North Idaho does not
apply because, "The City of Hayden could not point to any evidence that the actual cost of the hookup had increased in that extreme. Since the fee increase did not con-elate to a cost increase, the fee
increase was overturned." (Respondent's Brief, p. 16).
The City then baldly states the evidence below showed "the methodology the City of
Blackfoot used in setting out 19 different classifications and 74 different sub-classifications of users.
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No evidence against the City was presented that attacked the City's computations." That statement is
false and misleading.
The record is devoid of any methodology the City used to establish its EDU classifications
under either ordinance. Indeed, the only methodology the City used in crafting the May 2014
ordinance was to examine ordinances from other municipalities and then adopt something
That is not reliable methodology.

satisfactory to the City.

There are no scientific studies, no

engineering studies, and no cost analyses the City used to establish its framework of EDU multipliers
under either ordinance.

Conceding its base EDU of 350 gpd was not grounded on any actual

evaluation of the City's residential wastewater discharge but was simply the national standard, the
City has no reliable data to suppo1i its claimed methodology. Pertinent to the May 2014 ordinance,
the record is barren of any analysis the City employed showing an office building of 4,000 square
feet corresponds to 1 EDU.
MTLC's reliance on North Idaho is well placed. MILC has proven it does not and cannot
discharge wastewater equaling the City's base EDU standard of 350 gpd. The City has never refuted
that evidence. Diverting from the core issue, the City alleges, "The very root of the problem with
MJLC's case is that MILC wants the City to be able to provide an exact fee for the services provided
to each and every constituent."

It is unknown to MILC where the City came up with that allegation. MILC has always
challenged the City's assessment of 2 EDU multipliers to the Building. No facts support the City's
assessment of 2 EDU multipliers under either ordinance. Consequently, MILC is being charged a
rate that bears no reasonable relationship to actual services provided.
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E. The district court erred as a matter of law in detennining the City did not violate MILC 's due
process rights when the City failed to give notice of the increase in EDU multipliers it was assessing
to the Building.
In its Respondent's Brief, the City finally acknowledged it used a form for purposes of
making EDU assessments. The August 13, 2014 form is part of the augmented clerk' s record.

(Order Granting Motion to Augment Clerk 's Record).
In its Respondent's Brief, the City stated the form was for the purpose of recording the
reasoning behind a certain assessment and the form was given to the property owner.

Directly

opposing the City' s allegation that the form was given to the property owner is the testimony of its
wastewater treatment supervisor, Rex Moffat and the Affidavit of Gregg Manwaring.

Moffat

testified the August 13, 2014 form was not given to MILC. Moffat confirmed that MILC did not at
any time receive notice from the City regarding the assessment of 2 EDUs to the Building.
Manwaring testified the City never gave notice to MILC of the assessment of 2 EDUs to the
Building.
On the August 13, 2014 assessment form, the reason for the 2 EDU points assessed was
stated as: " office complex shared facilities." That reason is not found in the May 2014 ordinance.
Consequently, the assessment was arbitrarily based on shared facilities.
Further, the City argues MILC has no property right to which due process applies. The
City's May 2014 ordinance belies the City's argument. The concluding paragraph of the ordinance
provides a property owner with the right to challenge an assessment within 30 days of when the
assessment was made.

Unmistakably, the City acknowledges a property right is involved when

dealing with EDU assessments where it creates process for challenging its assessments. Additionally,
Moffat testified that the form should be given to a property owner to allow the owner to challenge the
assessment.
7

Where MILC never received any notice of an assessment, it was denied due process.

F.

The district court erred as a matter of law

in

failing to award MILC damages incurred

through overpayment of sewer fees to the City.
Although the City contends that under I.C. §§ 50-219 and 6-906, MILC cannot be awarded
damages for overpayments prior to 2014, the City never raised that issue below. The City has
waived any right to assert a defense under J.C. § 50-219.
MILC has provided compelling reasons for reversing the district court' s decision and
remanding the action to the magistrate division for entry of damages.

-

G.

The district court erred in concluding the issuance of an injunction was moot.
The City suggests MILC did not establish irreparable harm required for an injunction. The

City did not address the analysis of abuse of discretion set forth in Appellant's Brief. The authority
and argument presented in Appellant's Brief on this issue was not challenged by the City.
Compell ing MTLC to pay double the rate for sewer services over the life of the Building is
irreparable harm. Maintaining the status quo of the parties was the proper exercise of discretion. Not
granting an injunction was an abuse of discretion.

H.

The district court erred in determining the magistrate did not abuse its discretion in denying

MTLC" s motion for reconsideration.
The City failed to address any of the abuse of discretion standards and arguments raised in
Appellant's Brief.

ummary stating the district court was correct is insufficient response.
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MILC established through persuasive authority and reasoning that the district court erred in
detennining the magistrate did not abuse its discretion in denying MJLC ' s motion for
reconsideration. The City offered nothing to contradict MILC's arguments.

I.

MJLC is entitled to an award ofcosts and attorney fees on appeal.
In the event the Supreme Court reverses the district court, MILC will be entitled to an award

of its costs and attorney fees on appeal. The basis for such an award was set forth in Appellant' s
Brief. Nothing in the City's Respondent's Briefchallenges MILC's argument.

J.

The City of Blackfoot is not entitled to an award of costs and attorney's fees on ai:meal.
fn the event the Supreme Court reverses the district court, the City will not be the prevailing

party and will not be entitled to an award of costs and fees on appeal.
In the event the Supreme Court upholds the district court, the City is not entitled to an award
of costs and fees on appeal for the following reason.
An award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121 is inappropriate
where a party merely cites to the code section and fails to provide any argument as to
why the party is entitled to the award pursuant to the code section. Under the Idaho
Appellate Rules, a party is required to include in its opening brief "the contentions of
the [party] with respect to the issues presented on appeal , the reasons therefor, with
citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon."

***
The Lawrences have failed to explain how they are entitled to attorney fees pursuant
to LC. § 12-121, and have failed to explain the Court's standard under I.C. § 12-121
or how this appeal meets that standard.
Marek v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 50, 57-58, 278 P.3d 920, 927-928 (2012), followed , Lee v. Lister,
Sup. Ct. 2017 slip opinion no. 2, (January 20, 2017).
The City failed to explain how it is entitled to costs and attorney fees on appeal. The City
failed to explain the Court's standard under J.C. § 12-117 and how the appeal meets that standard.
9

Upon the City's failure to support its reasoning for costs and fees , it is not entitled to an award of
costs and fees on appeal.

CONCLUSION
The decision of the district court should be reversed. The case should be remanded to the
magistrate for entry of judgment in favor ofMILC and determination of damages. costs, and fees.
Dated this

2nd

day of March 2017.

V

~~

Kipp L. Manwaring
Attorney for Appellant
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